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This article is a response to the commentaries on the position paper on observed-
score equating by van der Linden (this issue). The response focuses on the more
general issues in these commentaries, such as the nature of the observed scores that
are equated, the importance of test-theory assumptions in equating, the necessity to
use multiple equating transformations, and the choice of conditioning variables in
equating.
Progress in any area of research relies critically on the willingness of its partic-
ipants to engage in an open exchange of arguments. I am therefore grateful to the
authors of the commentaries on my position paper on observed-score equating (van
der Linden, this issue) for their willingness to engage in a discussion on the topic.
The commentaries appear to fall into two entirely different groups. Bradlow (this
issue), González and M. von Davier (this issue), and M. von Davier, González,
and A. von Davier (this issue) emphasize the new research that has to be done. In
fact, M. von Davier et al. have already embarked on it, looking into the potentially
different roles of various mainstream response models for the case of local equating
based on item response theory (IRT). On the other hand, Dorans (this issue) and
Holland (this issue) appear to be critical of several of the notions I have used in my
review of the current tradition of observed-score equating and the presentation of
the proposed alternatives. I appreciate the candidness of all their remarks; the deeper
the critique, the richer the discussion, and the better the opportunity to improve our
insights.
Given the space for this response, I have decided to omit my reactions to each of
the comments on my set of examples. The first example, with the equating of age to
mathematics scores for two entirely different groups of persons, was only to show
that a Q-Q transformation can be used to map any empirical distribution onto any
other. All other examples were to show how the current practice of observed-score
equating still struggles with the ability measured by the two test forms as one of its
two main confounding—or in statistical terms: biasing—factors. I take it that readers
understand that my first example was not an attempt at any serious score equating and
that I exaggerated in some of the other examples (Guttman items do not exists; some
of the ability differences were large indeed) to make the nature of the problem visible.
Instead, I will focus on a few more general issues underlying the commentaries.
The issues are: the nature of the observed scores, the role of test theory, the necessity
of multiple transformations, and the choice of conditioning variables in equating.
I then conclude with a brief response to a few miscellaneous issues raised in the
commentaries.
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Observed-Score Equating
The first (hyphenated) word in the title of this section reminds us of what we
equate: observed scores. Current equating does not appear to be based on any explicit
ideas about their nature. Rather, its focus is almost exclusively on the remaining word
in the title: equating. In doing so, it emphasizes technique over meaning. But how
could we ever appreciate the quality of any observed-score equating if we are left in
the dark about what we equate?
As indicated in the position paper, a critical assumption underlying all of test the-
ory is the one of observed scores as random across replications. Let me just briefly
review how classical test theory deals with this assumption. (My preference would
have been how IRT does this, because it directly addresses the confounding of the
ability measured by the observed scores with the properties of the items, but classical
test theory already helps me to make my point.) The basic classical model reached
its final form in the minimal set of assumptions required to derive all of the known
results in classical test theory presented by Novick (1966). It has become the stan-
dard representation of the model through its inclusion in Lord and Novick (1968,
Chapter 2).
Actually, at the level of a single examinee p responding to a single test X, the
model consists of only one empirical assumption, exactly the one of the observed
score Xp being random across replications. The next two steps involve statements
of interest rather than any additional assumptions. The first statement claims the ex-
pected value (or mean) of Xp as the quantity of interest. This seems a natural choice;
the expected value is a better summary of the entire distribution of the observed score
than any single value X p = x happened to be observed during one administration of
the test. Classical test theory labels this expected value as the true score of test taker
p on X. So, more formally, it defines the true score as
τYp ≡ E(X p). (1)
The next step defines the difference between τX p and X p as measurement error:
EX p ≡ τX p − X p, (2)
which, again, seems a natural choice: If the interest is in τX p and the only thing
actually observed is X p = x , the difference should be considered as error.
Observe the necessity of the full subscripts in τX p and EX p . They remind us of the
fact that both the true score and the measurement error in X p depend on its entire
distribution. For any other examinee or test, we will have a different random variable
as observed score and therefore a different true score and different measurement
error. Also, note that τX p is fixed but EX p is random; the latter is defined as a function
of X p, which itself is random.
The well-known equation
X p = τX p + EX p , (3)
underlying all of classical test theory, follows directly from Equation 2. Of course, in
the context of observed-score equating, the same equation holds for a new test form
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Y of which the scores have to be equated back to those on X:
Yp = τYp + EYp . (4)
So, what does this mean for observed-score equating? The first thing to note is
that whatever is done to the left sides of Equations 3 and 4 automatically is done
to their right sides. Consequently, any equating of observed scores involves equat-
ing of their measurement error as well. Holland (this issue, p. 293) finds this hard
to understand: “the conditional distributions that go into the true equating transfor-
mation . . . involve the error distributions around the true scores. So, the noise in the
test scores is playing a role here in a way that is hard to understand.” Dorans (this
issue, p. 309) is even outright against it, claiming that local equating just “employs
a family of score-specific linkages between two sets of residual error scores,” “sim-
ply aligns the conditional error score distributions associated with each level of θ,”
and therefore achieves “artificial strong equity by producing comparable conditional
error score distributions” (italics are mine). But what is wrong with equated distri-
butions of error scores if they are the result of equated observed scores? And what
is artificial about the result? Nothing, I would say; on the contrary, the equalities in
Equations 3 and 4 just show that we are on the right track.
Let me explain more in detail how local equating deals with this issue. Its equating
consists of two steps: First, it tries to identify the Q-Q transformation that maps the
distribution of Yp in Equation 4 onto the one of X p in Equation 3. Second, it uses the
transformation to assign the realized score Yp = y to a score on X that serves as the
equated score. We have only one realized score on Y. But it is a mathematical fact
that if we were able to conduct the same experiment repeatedly, the distribution of
the equated scores on Y would be identical to that of X p; that is, we would meet the
criterion of equity exactly. Again, observe that the method directly addresses the ob-
served scores on the two test forms (the left sides of Equations 3 and 4), transforming
the distribution of one of them to match the other. Because of the definitions of the
true score and measurement error in Equations 1 and 2 as a function of the observed
score, the two quantities on their right sides are also matched. Again, how could we
ever match one without the others?
We are now close to another, more fundamental issue in observed equating, which
I did not address in the position paper but has puzzled me deeply. I am raising it here
because I feel it might help explain Dorans’s disdain for “just aligning error.” The
issue has to do with the very goal of observed-score equating, namely, its mimicking
of a realized score on the old form, complete with its error component, by a transfor-
mation applied to the realized score on the new form. Is this observed-score equating
something we really should want to do? Or should we try to improve on the score
on the new form by linking it to the true score on the old form (“observed-to-true
score equating”)? Both imply mappings from the score on the new form to a score on
the old form, and thus deal with this aspect of the equating. But as educational mea-
surement specialists, we are hold to report the best possible scores to the examinees.
And what is best in this case? Although there certainly are serious technical aspects
involved in the answer to this question, the choice seems primarily an ethical one.
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Role of Test Theory
The previous section illustrated again how important it is to begin with test theory
when we embark on observed-score equating. It forces us to make our assumptions
about the scores we equate explicit, which are then available for scrutiny and open
to debate. However, except for Levine’s linear equating, the literature on observed-
score equating has avoided adopting even the simple classical test-theory model in
Equations 1 and 2. But does this mean it is actually free of any assumptions about
the nature of test scores?
One of the useful distinctions I remember from my own education is the one be-
tween measurement by fiat and model-based measurement (Torgerson, 1958). Mea-
surement by fiat basically views measurement as a policy decision. It relies entirely
on procedures agreed upon by a community of researchers. Of course, their use may
involve complicated computer algorithms running extensive data analyses. But they
are not derived from any explicit assumptions, let alone involve any empirical check
on them. The only thing required to justify their use is adoption by a community.
Model-based measurement, on the other hand, begins with an explicit statement of
all of its assumptions about the response data in the form of a model. The choice of
model is open to discussion. Also, the procedures used in model-based measurement
are no ad hoc inventions, but procedures derived from mainstream statistics applied
to the model for the given set of data. They allow us to estimate the examinees’ scores
and other model parameters, evaluate the bias and accuracy of these estimates, and
check the fit of the model to the data. This model-based approach is not unique to
educational or psychological measurement, but is something that they share with
every other area where statistical methods are applied.
From Dorans’s commentary, I have the impression that he wants equating to be
free of any modeling. In fact, its last section even seems to suggest that a whole
generation of psychometricians has gone awry pursuing a model-based approach.
But, again, does this mean that current observed-score equating is free of any as-
sumptions? How about the idea of test scores as fixed numbers across replications?
Is this not an assumption? Or the idea that a “synthetic population” would enable
us to standardize away the confounding effect of the ability measured by the two
test forms? Or, more specifically, the assumption of stratified random sampling of
examinees necessary to derive the distribution functions for this synthetic population
(see Equations 7 and 8 in the position paper). And is equating error really sampling
error only—something that entirely disappears if we increase the size of the “random
sample” of examinees, even for test forms of, say, three items? And what does the
assumption of equal reliability mean if the observed-scores are assumed to be fixed
numbers? Or how about the assumption of a Platonic true score to which Dorans
seems to adhere? At least, I find it difficult to interpret the statement “calling an ex-
pected score a true score does not make it a true reality or true in the sense of false or
true” (Dorans, this issue, p. 310) as anything other than the assumption of a Platonic
true score (Lord & Novick, 1968, Section 2.1). In fact, each of the 11 conclusions in




Dorans’s conception of statistics seems to be permeated by Platonism as well.
Things are either “knowable” or “unknowable.” For example, he appears to be
against the requirement of equity because it “requires knowledge of unknowable
constructs” (this issue, p. 308), and tries making us believe that “Lord recommended
IRT observed-score equating” because it did “not require knowledge of an exami-
nee’s unknowable true score or θ” (this issue, p. 309). But how about the idea of
estimating unknown quantities (actually one of the steps required in “Lord’s recom-
mended IRT observed-score equating”; see below)? Is that not what statistics is all
about—the distinction between unknown parameters and observed data, with esti-
mates of the former defined on the latter, which are then evaluated for how well they
do their job?
My basic problem with measurement by fiat, in which observed-score equating
still seems to be rooted, is not so much the tendency to hide its own assumptions and
blame others for theirs, but a fear of its ultimate consequences. The step from policy
to politics is small. If we ground measurement on policy decisions, any attempt to
settle differences between policies may very well end in a struggle for power. The
claim that “users” will never accept the position paper in this issue—but apparently
fully understand and appreciate what is done right now—may already be indicative
of this trajectory. At least, I find it difficult to see any difference, for instance, with
the claim regularly made by politicians that they know exactly “what the American
people want” (invariably precisely what they want themselves).
Needless to say that I feel quite at home with the commentaries by Bradlow,
M. von Davier et al., and González and M. von Davier. The representation of the
observed-score equating problem by González and M. von Davier as a statistical es-
timation problem with the equating function as the unknown parameter that is to be
estimated is formally correct and their outline of the different approaches available
to attack the problem is most helpful. The same holds for the various suggestions by
Bradlow (hierarchical Bayesian structure; possible advantages of cross validation;
role of possible context effects on the items; etc.). Each of them is derived from
mainstream statistics and deserves to be explored for their possible improvements of
observed-score equating. M. von Davier et al. have taken the lead in an exploration
of the role of different response models in local equating based on IRT.
Multiple Equating Transformations
Regardless of the choice of “population” of examinees on which traditional
equipercentile equating is conducted, its results are always biased against each of
its members. I have tried to give several arguments and examples highlighting this
fact in the position paper, including the formal argument that one transformation of
observed scores can never be successful in any attempt to remove bias due to two
different sources of confounding. None of the commentators has made any remarks
on my arguments, so I take it everyone has accepted them. Nevertheless, some of
them find it hard to accept a logical consequence of it—the necessity of multiple
equating transformations.
Holland (this issue, p. 293) is most direct in his rejection of this consequence. He
claims that it would put us in a very embarrassing situation where Juan and Mary
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both have the same score on Y but different θ values due to measurement error. We
would then “map their common Y-score onto two different X-scores . . . because their
θs (which are not observable) are different!”
But what if we have information that does point at different abilities for Juan and
Mary? Let us assume for a moment that we actually know their abilities and their
observed scores are distributed as in Figure 1. These two distributions are realistic
in the sense that each of them is for the same 30-item test sampled from a retired
calibrated item pool generated for a different θ value using the algorithm in Lord and
Wingersky (1984). Given the distributions, it is not unlikely for examinees as Juan
and Mary to have the same score of Y = 23. For Juan, the score is the result of a
positive measurement error; for Mary, it implies a negative error.
The true equating transformations for Mary and Juan in Equation 5 below allow
for the differences between their observed-score distributions in Figure 1, mapping
the distribution of Mary to a distribution on X more to the right than for Juan, con-
sequently giving her a higher equated score. Should we completely ignore all this
information? Or use it to report different equated scores? It is a standard require-
ment for any application of statistics to provide estimates of the statistical properties
of the quantities that are reported. We know that equipercentile equating based on
the marginal score distributions for any population with Juan and Mary biases their
equated scores differently, so it is mandatory to report their bias. But what is a report
with estimates of different bias in the same equated score for two examinees other
than different equated scores for both of them?
The key question, of course, is, where does the extra information about Juan and
Mary’s abilities come from? For the example in Figure 1 the answer is simple: their
response vectors. Both had the same number-correct score but answered different
items correctly. Without any discussion, the literature on observed-score equating
assumes that number-correct scoring is the proper way to score any test (another
assumption!). But actually, it is just a gratuitous form of data reduction, decimating
the full information in the complete response vector. In fact, I would even argue
that hiding the information on what items were answered correctly is just unfair,
especially to those examinees who were successful on the more difficult items.
Most conceptual problems with current observed-score equating are due to this
unfortunate choice of number-correct scoring: If we did base our test scores on the
full information in the response pattern, we would have to account for all psycho-
metric differences between the items. But if we account for all differences between
test items, we automatically account for the differences between items in different
test forms measuring the same variable as well; that is, the equating problem would
disappear! In fact, accounting for differences between test items is exactly what IRT
is designed to do, which explains why its use does not entail any score equating
problem at all. Hence, my preference for IRT expressed at the end of the position
paper.
There are other sources of information that could improve observed-score equat-
ing as well, but before discussing them, I would like to address an interesting re-
sult for the Rasch model described by M. von Davier et al. (this issue). This model
has the number-correct score as a sufficient statistic for the ability parameter, which
means that, provided it holds, these scores do capture all the information available in
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Figure 1. Example of two test takers with different abilities but the same
realized observed score, Y = 23. Reproduced from van der Linden (2011).
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the response patterns. Consequently, the model implies a unique θ̂ for each realized
number-correct score Y = y, and local equating under the Rasch model boils down
to a unique equated score for each possible score on Y. I fully agree with the for-
mal aspect of this result, but find it difficult to accept the authors’ interpretation of it
as indicating that “local equating does not exist under the Rasch model” but rather
amounts to a “different type of IRT true-score equating” (p. 296).
First of all, the authors present two different attempts to derive the local equation
transformations under the Rasch model, one in their Equations 9 and 10 and another
in Equations 11 and 12. My preference is for the standard derivation in the latter,
with the compound binomials as the conditional distributions of X and Y given θ.
The constants c(rx ) and c(ry) in the right-hand side of their Equation 11 are just the
cumulative probabilities for these conditional distributions, found by the Lord and
Wingersky (1984) algorithm. The first attempt does not lead to any result because it
already defines the local transformation as a function of estimates rather than as a
parameter that has to be estimated.
So, the authors’ result is just the family of true equating transformations for the
general case in the position paper,
x = ϕ(y; θ) = F−1X |θ(GY |θ(y)), (5)
but now with the specific form of the conditional cumulative distribution functions
for the Rasch model. Similarly, it still gives us a different equating transformation
for each possible (real) value of θ. The only difference occurs when we use it in the
two steps of an actual equating. In the first step, just as for any of the other response
models studied by these authors, we still pick a different equation from the family in
Equation 5 for each θ estimate. But in the second step, as each possible θ̂ now is asso-
ciated with only one possible realization Y = y, every time we pick a transformation
we always use it for the same Y = y, whereas we have multiple possible realizations
for each of the transformations for the other models. The proper interpretation is thus
the use of a different transformation x = ϕ(y; θ̂) for each θ̂, but each of them only for
the same y in its domain. The difference in interpretation is immediately clear if we
have to equate from a form Y shorter or longer than X. We would then have fewer
or more equations than the number of score points on X, respectively, and the one-
to-one mapping observed by M. von Davier et al. disappears. The same conclusion
follows if we equate with θ estimated from an anchor test, as in Janssen, Magis, San
Martin, and Del Pino (2009).
Finally, although the presence of a sufficient statistic for θ does simplify
maximum-likelihood estimation in the Rasch model, its advantage should not be
overrated. For instance, as just highlighted, it forces us to make much less finer
distinctions between the examinees than for the other models reviewed by the au-
thors. Also, the observation that number-correct scores “capture all the information
about θ available in the response patterns” only warrants a second-order property of
maximum-likelihood estimation of θ based on number-correct scores, namely, mini-
mal (asymptotic) variance of its estimator. Particularly, it does not inform us in any
way about the location of the estimator; we still need the information about the item
parameters to score the examinees. In other words, fit of the Rasch model is not a
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license to report number-correct scores to examinees. It immediately follows that
the mapping produced by local equating based on number-correct scores under the
Rasch model should not be interpreted as a variation on IRT true-score equating.
The interpretation would hold if the two forms had the same set of items parameters.
But then they would be parallel, and no observed-score equating would be necessary
at all.
Choice of Conditioning Variable
Continuing the discussion about the observed scores of Juan and Mary in Figure 1,
for any population that includes both of them, the presence of Juan tends to introduce
a negative effect on the equated score of Mary: As traditional equating does not allow
for the impact of ability on the observed scores, it automatically takes the presence
of Juan as a manifestation of a less difficult form and compensates for it, generally
by producing a lower equated score for Mary than she deserves (see, for instance, the
plots in van der Linden, 2000, Figure 3). The more Juans present in the population
with Mary, the greater the impact on her equated score. Of course, at the same time,
the opposite holds for the impact of Mary on the equated score of Juan.
The use of IRT to estimate the local equations in Equation 5 is effective, as the
example in Figure 12 of the position paper shows. But, as already indicated, it cer-
tainly is not the only option; see the overview by González and M. von Davier (this
issue). Actually, this is a good moment to emphasize that except for the examples
in Figures 11 and 12, the position paper did not assume any IRT at all. The only
thing it did do until the presentation of these examples was the adoption of the basic
distinction between the properties of the test items and the ability measured by the
forms, using θ as a symbol for the latter. But we should not be misled by this choice
of notation; one only adopts IRT by adopting one of its models and applying it.
As for other possible options, the critical factor to notice is the size of the dif-
ference between the abilities of Juan and Mary. The smaller the difference, the less
biasing the effect of the presence of either on the equated score for the other. It fol-
lows that a restriction of the equating to response data for abilities close to that of
the examinee for which we equate can be expected to reduce the bias in the equated
scores. The name “local equating” has been chosen exactly because of the attempt to
restrict the data for the equating to examinees with neighboring abilities only.
The statistical operation that gives us the restriction is conditioning the scores that
need to be equated on the additional information we may have about the abilities
of their examinees. In an IRT framework, the conditioning on θ̂ works because we
have the additional information in the response pattern. The only variation between
the true abilities of the examinees left is that due to the estimation error in θ̂ (which
vanishes for a longer and/or better designed test). But conditioning on any other vari-
able with a strong relationship with the common variable measured by the two forms
works too. In fact, conditioning on a variable that leads only to a small reduction in
the variability of the abilities is already better than keeping the entire distribution of
the abilities of all examinees in the study.
One other option already investigated is conditioning on the score on the anchor
test in a NEAT design (van der Linden & Wiberg, 2010; Wiberg & van der Linden,
2011). Ideally, an IRT estimate of θ from the anchor test should be used (Janssen
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et al., 2009). But, because of the monotone relationship between its expected value
for each examinee and the common variable measured by the two forms, a number-
correct score for the anchor test already works; see the example in Figure 13 in the
position paper. Other options still need to be explored. Examples of variables with
a potentially useful relationship to the one measured by the test forms are response
times on their items, scores on earlier related tests or other tests in a same battery,
success in previous schooling, or any combination of them.
We should be aware of two critical issues. First, the fact that collateral informa-
tion is easily available does not mean that it is always ethically correct to use it.
Obvious examples of information we should avoid for this reason are socioeconomic
variables. Besides, we should be prepared to face a trade-off between how close the
conditioning gets us to the ability of the examinee and the amount of data left to
equate—another example of the bias-accuracy trade-off discussed in the position pa-
per. However, the bias, standard error, and MSE functions in Equations 10–12 of the
position paper are examples of proper statistical tools to deal with it.
The idea of conditioning observed-score equating on other variables describing
the examinees has been around in the literature for some time, typically with the
use of the terminology of “matching” or “equating in subpopulations.” In fact, there
even exist studies with samples matched on an anchor score, for example, the one by
Lawrence and Dorans (1990). However, these authors used the anchor score only as a
stratifying variable to create matching samples for the two test forms, not to condition
on its individual values. And matching samples for two forms do not necessarily help
us to reduce the differences between the abilities of their examinees required to avoid
bias in their equated scores.
The use of biographical variables as conditioning variables to study population in-
variance by Dorans and Holland (2000) was already addressed in the position paper.
The only goal of these authors was to create socially relevant subpopulations. It is
somewhat ironic to read this article because of one of its conclusions that the use of
“a single linking function is inappropriate when population invariance fails to hold
for important subpopulations” (p. 384), in which case we should resort to a “sys-
tem of multiple linking functions for multiple subpopulations.” Apparently, the use
of multiple equating transformations is good when dealing with differences between
socially relevant subpopulations but bad for subpopulations of homogeneous ability
created to prevent bias in their equated scores. [The same article claims that “the
symmetry requirement (for observed-score equating) does not appear . . . to be very
fundamental and rarely gives useful further guidance in selecting one linking func-
tion over another” (p. 285). It then goes on to introduce “types of linking functions
(for which) we can only expect this symmetry to hold approximately” (p. 292). So,
the criterion of symmetry appears to be less solid than these authors claim in their
commentaries.]
Use of the methodological terminology of matching is interesting in that it is rem-
iniscent of the literature on experimental design (e.g., Shadish, Cook, & Campbell,
2002). Experimental designs differ from quasi-experimental or nonexperimental de-
signs in their use of effective methods for the control of undesirable confounding
by covariates. The three main methods of control are: randomization, matching,
and statistical adjustment. The examinee-by-test-form design used in observed-score
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equating is just a research design in the sense of this literature. It is effective to the
extent that it controls both for the differences in ability between the examinees and
difficulty between the forms. Traditional equating attempts to control for the differ-
ences in ability by standardizing the shape of their distributions in the two groups,
and then uses statistical adjustment (here: an equating transformation) to account for
the differences in difficulty between the two forms. It fails because standardization
of the shape of distributions is not a method of experimental control. On the other
hand, local equating controls for the differences between the abilities by matching on
them and then uses statistical adjustment for each of the matched groups to control
for the differences in difficulty between the two forms. Both steps involve known,
effective methods of experimental control. Together they imply the use of multiple
equating transformations.
Miscellaneous Issues
How about the following proof of the fact that shingles vaccination does not work?
“Peter took the vaccine and developed shingles. Paul never took it and never got any
shingles.” No more details are available. Besides, Peter and Paul do not exist. The
whole story is just a figment of this author’s mind.
No one would accept this type of “proof by illusion.” Nevertheless, Dorans (this
issue) has used it to reveal a paradox in local equating. His figments are two exami-
nees (L and N) with different number-correct scores on different portions of the same
tests that are then cross-equated. No empirical score distributions are available, let
alone any equating transformations derived from them. But Dorans seems to know
exactly what the numerical values of the equated scores of L and N are, and what
eventually happens to them—a “paradox.”
Actually, a simple mathematical derivation already shows how local equating be-
haves when a test is equated to itself. Let X and Y now denote the same test admin-
istered to any group. For each θ, it then holds that
FX |θ(y) = GY |θ(y), (6)
and therefore
ϕ(y; θ) = F−1X |θ(GY |θ(y))
= G−1Y |θ(GY |θ(y))
= y. (7)
Thus, the true transformations in Equation 5 specialize to the identity transforma-
tion for each θ, exactly what we would expect for a test form equated to itself.
I also have to disagree with Dorans’s view of Lord’s (1980) Chapter 13 on equat-
ing. Indeed, Lord did discard IRT true-score equating as a method of observed-score
equating, simply because true scores are not observed scores. But the claim that he
recommended IRT observed-score equating because it “did not require knowledge
of an examinee’s unknowable true score or θ” (Dorans, this issue, p. 309) cannot
be true: IRT observed-score equating does require estimation of the examinee’s θs
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and then averages the conditional distributions FX |̂θ(x) and GY |̂θ(y) across these es-
timates before performing equipercentile equating.
Actually, Lord did not recommend any specific type of equating at all. All con-
cluding remarks in the last section of his chapter hinge on the fact that he missed
a criterion for evaluating approximate procedures that allowed him to choose one.
Hence, his lament: “If you can’t be fair (provide equity) to everyone, what is the
best next thing?” (p. 207, italics by Lord). His only comment about equipercentile
equating in this section is that it produces the same proportion of accepted exami-
nees for different forms when a test is used for selection purposes, upon which he
immediately points at the illusionary nature of this advantage: “Thus, equipercentile
‘equating’ of raw scores gives an appearance of being fair to everyone” (p. 207;
quotation marks around ‘equating’ by Lord; italics are mine). I invite the readers
to go over Lord’s chapter carefully and then compare Dorans’s (this issue) and my
interpretation of it (van der Linden, 2011).
My abandonment of the criterion of equal reliability remains a bone of contention
for Dorans and Holland. I have already indicated that the requirement is never used
in any step of any traditional equating procedure, and therefore is superfluous. Let
me add here that it is even unclear what the meaning of “equal reliability” could be.
The same reliability coefficient for the two test forms? But we know that a reliability
coefficient is equally sensitive to the distribution of the true scores in the group to
which a form is administered as to the actual accuracy of its scores. And in observed-
score equating, both forms are administered to different groups of examinees. So,
should we avoid the problem of different true-score distributions for different groups
and take “equal reliability” to mean equal accuracy of the observed scores on the two
forms that are to be equated? But the criterion then implies equal distributions of EX p
and EYp in Equations 3 and 4 for each examinee p, and the only type of linking left
is true-score equating.
Even if we had an unambiguous, meaningful definition of “equal reliability,” it is
still a mathematical fact that the Q-Q transformation can be used to equate any dis-
tribution to any other. Except for discreteness, the true transformations in Equation 5
equate the conditional error distributions on any test form to those on any other, in-
cluding the distributions on the 100-item and 10-item tests in the example by Dorans.
The example with the equating to the last three digits of the social security number
by Holland (this issue, p. 291) is somewhat misleading in that, unlike the author’s
suggestion, social security numbers are not random but fixed for each examinee. In
principle, it is possible to equate random observed scores to scores with a degener-
ate distribution, but only if they measure the same variable. All we then have to do
is choose the same degenerate distributions for FX |θ for each θ in Equation 5. But
Holland’s example does not involve any measurement of a common θ at all.
Any equated score, no matter how derived, is a mathematical function of the ob-
served score on the new form; that is, a new random variable ϕ(Yp). Its distribution
depends on the distribution of the score Yp from which we equate as well as the
choice of the equating function ϕ. Dependent on the choice of ϕ, the distribution of
ϕ(Yp) can be made narrower or wider than the one of Yp; that is, more or less accurate
than the score from which we equate. In fact, the traditional equipercentile transfor-
mation does both; for equally long forms, it increases the accuracy of the equated
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scores at points where its tangent has a slope of less than 45o but decreases when it is
steeper. The true transformations in Equation 5, on the other hand, always give each
equated score ϕ(Yp) exactly the same distribution—and thus the same accuracy—
as the observed score X p on the test to which we equate. Of course, this feature
only holds at the level of the definition of the equating transformation we want to
estimate. In an actual application, we always have estimation error in the equating
transformation, but, again, this is an entirely different issue.
Finally, Dorans (this issue, p. 305) seems to blame this author for ignoring some
of the distinctions made in Holland and Dorans (2006), especially their adoption
of scale alignment in addition to prediction and equating. But, frankly, it is hard
to understand what “scale alignment” could mean. In the context of observed-score
equating, a scale is just the set of possible numbers assigned to the examinees by the
scoring rules adopted for the test forms, exactly the same thing referred to more
generally as a sample space in statistics (González & M. von Davier, this issue,
p. 316). For each examinee, the observed score is a random variable with a distri-
bution over this scale. In addition, as just emphasized, an equating transformation is
nothing else than a mathematical function from the scale of Y to the scale of X, with
the goal to give each examinee the same distribution for his/her observed scores on
the two forms. It is important to carefully separate all these elements in your nota-
tion. Hence, my consistent use of X p and Yp for the observed scores on X and Y for
an arbitrary examinee p, x and y for the numbers these scores can take, and x = φ(y)
for the mathematical function from y (scale of Y) to x (scale of X).
According to Dorans, “scale alignment” is required to “produce comparable
scales,” which are “a necessary but not a sufficient condition for producing inter-
changeable scores” (p. 305). But number-correct scoring of forms of equal length
involves scales that are already identical. So, why would they ever need any align-
ment? The notion of “scale alignment” may already point at a misconception in the
very definition of the problem of observed-score equating.
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